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Abstract: This article examines private international law issues raised by transnational 
contractual networks. The focus is on choice-of-law questions that arise in the context of 1) 
relations between network members who are contractually bound to one another, 2) relations 
between network members not connected directly by bonds of contract, and 3) relations 
between the network and the outsiders. The aim is to assess whether, and to what extent, 
European private international law is capable of dealing with some of the key challenges 
posed by contemporary economic and social activity. 
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‘The line between what is inside and what is outside the 
corporation, once so clear, has become blurred… Firms 
such as Nike have stretched this idea to such an extent that 
some of them now make nothing: all Nike’s shoes, for 
instance, are manufactured by subcontractors. Nike 
employs few people directly. Such companies have 
become the orchestrators of a band. Their baton has only 
limited control over the musicians who play for them, but 
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that does not prevent them from producing great music (or 
shoes).’1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The way in which economic productive activity is coordinated is undergoing profound 
changes. The traditional, vertically-integrated firm is increasingly giving way to flexible 
forms of business organisation, which are characterised by a great degree of autonomy and 
interdependence of their constituent parts. Members of the modern economic enterprise are 
often not connected by bonds of ownership, but are ever more frequently independent firms 
bound together through long-term cooperative contractual and quasi-contractual relations or 
informal alliances. Such inter-organisational associations are far removed from both 
traditional corporations and discrete, spot, arm’s length transactions that occur in the market, 
which are the two paradigmatic types of relation that are the concern of company law and 
contract law, respectively. Relations between independent firms that pursue a common 
purpose without creating a new legal entity are defined by long-term duration, stability, 
multilaterality and the creation of governance structures for the coordination of economic 
activity and the exchange of knowledge and information. The term ‘contractual network’ is 
used in this article to capture this phenomenon.2 
Such modern forms of business organisation that go beyond the hierarchy-market and 
corporation-contract dichotomies have proven to be very good at coming up with innovative 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, University of Nottingham. This article will be published in (2016) 65 ICLQ.  
1 The Economist, 21 January 2006, special report on ‘The New Organisation: A Survey of the Company’, 18. 
2 The following terms have also been used in the literature: business networks; quasi-organisations; quasi-firms; 
virtual enterprises; multi-party hybrid business arrangements; complex economic organisations. See H Collins, 
‘Introduction’ in G Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Hart, 2011), 12. 
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products and services, retaining and expanding their base of customers and tapping into new 
markets. Since they naturally flow from the processes of decentralisation of economic 
activity, vertical disintegration of firms, privatisation, deregulation and globalisation, they 
have become a ubiquitous phenomenon in modern market capitalist economies. 
The ‘new organisation’3 poses significant challenges for the law. Generally speaking, 
lawyers think in terms of categories. Contract, tort, company law etc. are among the 
foundational concepts of modern legal systems that define our thinking about private law. 
This is reflected in an obvious manner in private international law. The Recast of the Brussels 
I Regulation,4 for example, lays down different rules of special jurisdiction for contractual 
and tortious matters in Articles 7(1) and 7(2), respectively. The fault line is even deeper in 
choice of law, where contractual and non-contractual obligations fall within the subject-matter 
scope of two different regulations: Rome I5 and Rome II.6 Company law issues are treated as 
a wholly different animal and accordingly given a special treatment in the law of adjudicatory 
jurisdiction7 and placed outside the subject-matter scope of the two Rome Regulations.8 And 
there are further divisions within these sub-systems of private law. General contract law, for 
example, is different from the law of labour and consumer contracts. But, as contractual 
networks show, life does not fit squarely into legal moulds. Being beyond hierarchy and 
market, contractual networks are hard to squeeze into the established legal categories of 
                                                 
3 The Economist (n 1). 
4 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] 
OJ L351/1. The Recast replaces Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, which replaced 
the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters [1972] OJ L299/32. See also the two Lugano Conventions on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of 1988 ([1988] OJ L319/9) and 2007 ([2009] OJ 
L147/1). 
5 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6, which replaces the Convention on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 [1980] OJ L266/1. 
6 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40. 
7 See Art 24(2) Brussels I Recast. 
8 Art 1(2)(f) and (g) Rome I; Art 1(2)(d) Rome II. 
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contract, tort and company law. Being defined in functional terms, they sometimes straddle 
the fault lines between commercial, consumption, employment etc. relations. 
Contractual networks do not only cut across entrenched legal classifications, but also 
across national boundaries. In Europe, for example, where fundamental economic freedoms 
are guaranteed, many contractual networks operate transnationally and are significant 
generators of economic output. Or, as the example of Nike mentioned in the quote above 
demonstrates, some transnational contractual networks are true global economic players. One 
would therefore expect private international lawyers, especially European ones, to be at the 
forefront of the research of this phenomenon and its legal regulation, in particular because 
contract and company lawyers who have taken an interest in contractual networks have tended 
not to take a transnational view of the problems that they generate and have examined them 
largely from the perspective of their own national legal systems.9 Surprisingly, however, not 
much attention has been given to this phenomenon in private international law. As will be 
explained in the following section, contractual networks raise three distinct types of problems 
concerning: 1) relations between network members who are contractually bound to one 
another; 2) relations between network members not connected directly by bonds of contract; 
and 3) relations between the network and the outsiders. Private international law scholarship 
has so far focused on specific types of contractual relations that fall within the general concept 
of a contractual network (e.g. distribution, construction, franchise, commercial agency 
contracts) and, even more specifically, on the problems of the first type mentioned above.10 
                                                 
9 A reason for this approach of substantive lawyers may be found in what Collins (n 2) describes, at p 28, as a 
‘double impossibility’: ‘The problem of comparative sociological jurisprudence is doubly impossible, because it 
adds to the existing problem of finding adequate modes of communication between law and socio-economics the 
further problem of establishing communications (or transplants) between autonomous national legal systems.’ 
10 See e.g. M-E Ancel, ‘The Rome I Regulation and Distribution Contracts’ (2008) 10 YBPIL 221; RH Christie, 
‘The Law Governing an International Construction Contract’ (2007) 24 International Construction Law Review 
343; L Garcia Gutierrez, ‘Franchise Contracts and the Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to International 
Contracts’ (2008) 10 YBPIL 233; P Mankowski, ‘Commercial Agents under European Jurisdiction Rules: The 
Brussels I Regulation Plus the Procedural Consequences of Ingmar’ (2008) 10 YBPIL 197; P Piroddi, 
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This article tackles two questions. First, will private international law benefit from the 
introduction of the concept of a contractual network into legal discourse? Second, what are 
the implications of the introduction of this concept for the legal regulation, practice and 
scholarship? In addressing these questions, this article examines whether, and to what extent, 
private international law raises to some of the key challenges posed by contemporary 
economic and social activity. The investigation is undertaken from the perspective of 
European private international law. The focus is not on any specific type of contractual 
relations that falls within the general concept of a contractual network. This phenomenon is 
rather explored in a holistic manner. Consequently, the aim of this article is not to offer an in-
depth analysis of all private international law issues that are potentially raised by all kinds of 
network contracts but primarily to set the foundations for discussion and future research. 
The following section (section II) looks more closely into the concept of a contractual 
network. By highlighting distinctive features of contractual networks, the scene is set for the 
discussion of the role of European private international law in regulating transnational 
networks (section III) and of private international law issues raised by internal (sections IV 
and V) and external (section VI) aspects of transnational networks. It is revealed that the rules 
of European private international law and its mode of reasoning are by and large struggling to 
accommodate this phenomenon. The final section (section VII) concludes and mentions 
several possible ways of improving the law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘International Subcontracting in EC Private International Law’ (2005) 7 YBPIL 289. Compare F Cafaggi and S 
Clavel, ‘Interfirm Networks across Europe: A Private International Law Perspective’ in F Cafaggi (ed), 
Contractual Networks, Inter-Firm Cooperation and Economic Growth (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 201; 
F Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act: Towards European Principles?’ (2008) 4 
European Review of Contract Law 493 (these two articles examine the concept of a contractual network from the 
perspective of private international law in a holistic manner; their main shortcoming is that they do not address 
external aspects of contractual networks, i.e. problems of the third type mentioned above) and H Muir Watt, 
‘Governing Networks: A Global Challenge for Private International Law’ (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 352 (the focus of this article is on external aspects of contractual networks). 
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II. THE CONTRACTUAL NETWORK: THE CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIVE FEATURES 
 
Contractual networks have generated a lot of interest among substantive lawyers.11 This 
section will therefore limit itself to outlining the concept of a contractual network and its 
distinctive features to the extent necessary to support the private international law discussion 
that follows in subsequent sections of this article. 
Defining contractual networks is not easy. Several definitions have been put forward 
in legal scholarship, thus adding to numerous definitions from other branches of the social 
sciences such as economics, sociology and business studies. According to Teubner, 
contractual networks are ‘modes of organising economic activities that bind formally 
independent firms who are more or less economically dependent upon one another through 
stable relationships and a complex reciprocity that is more cooperative than competitive in 
form.’12 Similarly, Collins defines contractual networks as associations of independent firms 
‘that enter a pattern of interrelated contracts, which are designed to confer on the parties many 
of the benefits of co-ordination achieved through vertical integration in a single firm, without 
in fact ever creating a single integrated business entity such as a corporation or a 
partnership.’13 
                                                 
11 See e.g. M Amstutz and G Teubner (eds), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation (Hart, 2009); D 
Campbell, H Collins and J Wightman (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational and Network 
Contracts (Hart, 2003); Cafaggi (n 10); H Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP, 1999), Ch 10; S Grundmann, F 
Cafaggi and G Vettori (eds), The Organizational Contract: From Exchange to Long-Term Network Cooperation 
in European Contract Law (Leiden, Netherlands; Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2013); Teubner, Networks as 
Connected Contracts, with introduction by Collins (n 2). 
12 Teubner (n 2), 92. Teubner borrows this definition from J Sydow, Strategische Netzwerke: Evolution und 
Organisation (Wiesbaden: Gabler, 1992), 82. 
13 Collins (n 2), 1; see also H Collins, ‘Introduction: The Research Agenda of Implicit Dimensions of Contracts’ 
in Campbell, Collins and Wightman (eds) (n 11), 19-20 and H Collins, ‘The Weakest Link: Legal Implications 
of the Network Architecture of Supply Chains’ in Amstutz and Teubner (eds) (n 11) 187. Similarly, JN Adams 
and R Brownsword, ‘Privity and the Concept of a Network Contract’ (1990) 10 Legal Studies 12, 27-8. 
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As is clear from these definitions, the concept of a contractual network is primarily an 
economic and sociological one. In order to understand it better, it is useful to look briefly into 
the reasons for its existence, as well as to compare and contrast it with related phenomena. 
Economic actors are always faced with the ‘make or buy’ dilemma. For example, 
sellers of products must decide whether to make a product on their own or to turn to the 
market for the acquisition of necessary inputs. A decision to make represents the basis for the 
establishment of vertically-integrated firms where labour is divided among employees whose 
work is coordinated by managers. A decision to buy results in the creation of contractual 
relations in the market. The job of economists is to explain why some economic activities are 
conducted through firms, whereas other similar activities occur through market transactions.14 
For present purposes, suffice it to say that the two basic reactions to the make or buy dilemma 
are at the core of the hierarchy-market dichotomy, which is conceived in legal terms as the 
paradigmatic binary divide between the corporation and the discrete, arm’s length, bilateral 
contractual relation with relatively bounded obligations that are performed instantaneously. 
There are, however, other forms of coordination of economic productive activity.15 
Sometimes, the efficient response to ex ante uncertainty, e.g. about the development of 
market conditions, is achieved neither through production in a vertically-integrated firm, nor 
through one-off exchanges in the market, but through long-term cooperative contractual 
relations. Due to their intended long-term, perhaps indefinite, duration and the surrounding 
uncertainty, such relations are necessarily incomplete by design. One party is expected to 
utilise its special skills, knowledge or information to act in the best interest of the other party 
and typically under the other party’s instructions. This gives rise to the principal-agent 
                                                 
14 Seminally, RH Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
15 See generally Collins (n 2), 4-13; Collins (n 11), Ch 10; S Grundmann, F Cafaggi and G Vettori, ‘The 
Contractual Basis of Long-Term Organization – The Overall Architecture’ in Grundmann, Cafaggi and Vettori 
(eds) (n 11) 3, 6-28; WW Powell, ‘Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’ (1990) 12 
Research in Organisational Behaviour 295. 
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problem. In order to deal with the risk of opportunism and free-riding on the part of the agent, 
and to protect its sunk investments, the principal typically establishes governance structures 
that enable it to supervise, monitor, incentivise and discipline the agent. These governance 
structures construct relations of power and domination, which can be abused by the principal. 
This theoretical model of ‘relational’ contracts16 is, however, incomplete. Most importantly, 
many long-term cooperative contractual relations are of a ‘symbiotic’ nature,17 characterised 
by two principal and agent relations, in which both parties act as the agent for the other party 
and, therefore, also as a principal. The law is confronted with the question of whether the 
general rules of contract law should be modified in the light of specific features of relational 
and symbiotic contracts, e.g. by creating adequate default and mandatory rules to secure trust 
between the parties and to protect and enhance the efficient operation of these contractual 
arrangements. 
There is a significant degree of overlap between the concepts of relational and 
symbiotic contracts and contractual networks. The theoretical model of contractual networks, 
however, emphasises the added dimension of multilaterality. Networks involve a collection of 
contractual relations, often symbiotic and relational, between multiple parties. The overall 
economic success of the network, i.e. the fulfilment of the network purpose, depends on the 
interaction, interdependence and cooperation of both members who are contractually bound to 
one another and members who are not immediate contractual parties. This requires the 
establishment of adequate structures, legal and non-legal, for the coordination of economic 
activity and the exchange of knowledge and information. Typical examples of contractual 
networks include franchise, distribution and commercial agency networks, production and 
                                                 
16 I Macneil, The Relational Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian Macneil (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2001); see also Collins, ‘Introduction’ in Campbell, Collins and Wightman (eds) (n 11), 18-24. 
17 C Kirschner, ‘Symbiotic Arrangements as a Challenge to Antitrust’ (1996) 152 Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 226; E Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-term Agency Structures between 
Contract and Corporation’ in C Joerges (ed), Franchising and the Law (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1991) 67; E 
Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Arrangements’ (1993) 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 691; see 
also Collins (n 11), 239-41. 
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supply chains, joint venture agreements, construction contracts, credit transfer networks, 
credit arrangements between banks, retailers and purchasers, temporary agency work etc. 
Contractual networks pose significant challenges for the law. The essential feature of 
contractual networks is the inherent tensions between different logics of action, which open 
up certain regulatory questions.18 Firstly, there is the tension between bilateral exchange and 
the logic of association. The model of contractual networks shows that the network as a whole 
has a purpose that transcends the interests of individual members and the purposes of bilateral 
contracts that form the network. But, since individual members of the network remain 
independent firms with their own particular and divergent interests, the network purpose and 
the interests of network members can never be fully aligned in all respects. This creates 
opportunities and incentives for disappointment and betrayal. The question arises whether the 
law should acknowledge this and infuse bilateral relations between network members with 
network-specific obligations such as a general duty of loyalty to the network purpose. 
A related tension concerns relations between network members who are not in a direct 
contractual relation with one another. The model of contractual networks demonstrates that 
the opportunistic behaviour of one network member can cause economic harm not only to 
network members with whom it has a direct contractual relation, but also to other members or 
the network as a whole. Can such ‘third party’ network members go around the doctrine of 
privity of contract and bring a successful claim against the free rider for causing them 
economic harm by undermining the network purpose and, if so, on what basis? 
The final tension concerns the relationship between the network as a multilateral 
construction of bilateral contracts and the outsiders. Whenever harm is caused to an outsider, 
regardless of whether or not the fault lies entirely with the network member who is in a direct 
                                                 
18 Collins (n 2), 14-8; Teubner (n 2), 178. 
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relationship with the third party victim, the network typically emphasises that its members are 
independent firms and that their liabilities are separate. This is often in contrast to the image 
that the network portrays to the general public. As a result, whereas all network members 
benefit from the advantages derived from the network as a whole, the external risks generated 
by the network’s economic activity are typically confined to the firm with direct exposure to 
the victim. The question arises whether the network as a whole or at least network members 
that somehow contributed to the harm – as opposed to just the individual network member 
who is directly exposed to the third party victim – should be made liable for damage caused to 
third parties and, similarly, whether third parties should be made liable to the network for the 
harm that they inflict on it. A related question that arises with respect to external aspects of 
contractual networks pertains to the membership of the network. Who is in and who is out? 
Should consumers in credit arrangements between banks, retailers and purchasers be treated 
as network members? What about workers in temporary agency work relations? 
Before proceeding further, a line should be drawn between contractual networks, 
which are the subject of this article, and a similar phenomenon of organisational networks.19 
Organisational networks are corporate groups, comprised of separate legal entities which are 
typically connected by bonds of ownership that establish hierarchical relations within the 
group, relatively clear management rights and organisational competencies. The built-in 
hierarchies are the primary feature of corporate groups, enabling coordination and the 
pursuance of the group’s collective purpose or aim. Contractual networks are a different 
animal. They are forms of market coordination and are primarily subject to market logic. ‘The 
primary concern is with exchange, competition, individual interests and individual actor 
rents… Within market networks, influence is primarily exercised by means of contract, 
                                                 
19 Teubner (n 2), 133-9. 
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bargaining, opposing power, market power and exchange positions’.20 Furthermore, corporate 
groups are a well-established and recognised phenomenon, which the law regulates – to a 
greater or lesser extent – through special corporate, competition, labour, tax law, accounting 
etc. rules. Contractual networks, on the other hand, are a wide-spread phenomenon for which 
specific legal regulation is largely absent. 
 
III. EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REGULATION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS 
 
Challenges posed by contractual networks are particularly important from the European 
perspective. Small and medium enterprises, which are the motors of European economies, are 
the most likely firms to form these inter-organisational associations. In order to facilitate the 
creation of networks, and to unlock the synergies that they produce, it is not enough for 
European law to guarantee fundamental economic freedoms. The law should also protect and 
enhance the efficiency of networks by contributing to the normalisation and stabilisation of 
their inherent tensions, securing trust, while also countering the risks that they create. One 
way to achieve this is through unified and harmonised regulation at the European level.21 But 
it is unlikely that this will be achieved, in the short- and mid-term at least. Consequently, as 
long as the regulation of contractual networks remains at national level with many different 
substantive law solutions to the regulatory questions that contractual networks open up, 
                                                 
20 Ibid, 138. 
21 See Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act: Towards European Principles?’ (n 10); C 
Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks and Contract Theory: A Research Agenda for European Contract Law’ in 
Cafaggi (ed) (n 10) 66; F Cafaggi and S Grundmann, ‘Towards a Legal Framework for European Transnational 
Networks?’ in Grundmann, Cafaggi and Vettori (eds) (n 11) 358. 
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European private international law continues to be a crucial mechanism for the coordination 
of legal diversity that exists in Europe. 
It is well established that private international law in general, and European private 
international law in particular, are performing important regulatory functions.22 A question for 
European private international law is whether the objectives pursued by its jurisdictional and 
choice-of-law rules, as well as the rules themselves or their interpretation and application, 
should be modified in the light of distinctive features and economic importance of 
transnational contractual networks. The reason there are uniform private international law 
rules in the European Union is to enhance the proper functioning of the internal market.23 
Since transnational contractual networks are a ubiquitous and important form of coordination 
of economic productive activity, and in the absence of substantive transnational regulation of 
this phenomenon, European private international law should take a conscious, active and 
positive role in their regulation. One must agree with Cafaggi and Clavel that European 
private international law should aim to foster cooperation and coordination in the network and 
thereby protect and enhance their efficient operation.24 In addition, and this is an important 
point that is neglected by most private international lawyers who have written about 
contractual networks,25 European private international law should help counter the risks that 
networks create. Whether European private international law is capable of achieving these 
                                                 
22 On the regulatory function of private international law see R Michaels, ‘New European Choice-of-Law 
Revolution’ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1607; A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International 
Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (CUP, 
2009); H Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy’ 
(2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 383; H Muir Watt, ‘Integration and Diversity: The Conflict of 
Laws as a Regulatory Tool’ in F Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP, 
2006) 107; H Muir Watt, ‘Private International Law Beyond the Schism’ (2011) 2 Transnational Legal Theory 
347; R Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International 
Law in an Era of Globalization’ (2002) 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 209. 
23 See Art 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (consolidated version) [2012] OJ C326/47 (TFEU); 
Recitals 3 and 4 Brussels I Recast; Recitals 1 and 6 Rome I; Recitals 1 and 6 Rome II. 
24 (n 10), 206. 
25 See n 10 above. 
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objectives is a question for the following three sections that concern internal and external 
aspects of contractual networks in private international law. 
The focus of this article is on choice-of-law issues raised by transnational contractual 
networks. This is because the law of adjudicatory jurisdiction seems capable of dealing 
relatively well with the network phenomenon, since many jurisdictional bases are not 
grounded in the distinction between contract, tort, company law etc. Most importantly, there 
are jurisdictional rules that are based on the connection between different defendants and 
different claims. Thus, an EU domiciliary who is one of a number of defendants can be sued 
in the courts for the place in the EU where any of the co-defendants is domiciled, provided the 
claims are sufficiently closely connected.26 To take another example, the traditional English 
law of jurisdiction, which applies, generally speaking, to determine the jurisdiction of English 
courts over non-EU domiciliaries, lays down a similar rule in para 3.1(3) of the Civil 
Procedure Rules Practice Direction 6B. This rule which provides for the possibility of 
commencing proceedings against a person who is a necessary or proper party to a claim that is 
already pending between the claimant and another defendant. The existence of these and other 
jurisdictional rules under which the nature of the claim is immaterial mitigates the problems 
raised by transnational contractual networks. But networks do present certain difficulties with 
regard to jurisdictional rules that are based on the distinction between contract, tort, company 
law etc, as exemplified by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
and the courts of EU Member States dealing with Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the Brussels I 
Recast and their predecessors,27 and with regard to the personal scope of choice-of-court 
clauses.28 
                                                 
26 Art 8(1) Brussels I Recast. See also Art 8(2) (third party proceedings) and 8(3) (counter-claims). 
27 On the delimitation of the spheres of application of Arts 7(1) and 7(2) see Case C-26/91 Jakob Handte & Co 
GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces SA [1992] ECR I-3967 and the recent Case C-548/12 
Brogsitter v Fabrication de Montres Normandes ECLI:EU:C:2014:148, [2014] QB 753, noted by A Dickinson, 
‘Towards an Agreement on the Concept of “Contract” in EU Private International Law?’ [2014] LMCLQ 466. In 
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When examining choice-of-law issues in the context of contractual networks, one 
should keep in mind the distinction made by Brownsword between voluntary and imposed 
networks in contracts.29 According to him, there are two justificatory bases for holding parties 
to a set of rules governing network relations. One justification rests on freedom of contract, in 
the sense that the parties have freely chosen to be bound by such rules. The other justification 
relies on the merits of the rules themselves. The parties are bound by a particular set of rules 
governing network relations not because they have been freely chosen, but because they are 
right by reference to certain objective criteria such as efficiency or fairness. Consequently, the 
law should, in principle, support the parties’ choice to create freely a particular kind of 
governance structure for their transactions, which includes the freedom to choose the legal 
regime applicable to network relations. Rules governing network relations, including the 
applicable substantive law, should be imposed only if justified on the basis of objective 
criteria. This distinction between procedural and substantive justifications for the application 
of the network concept is important because it provides a useful framework for the assessment 
of the European choice-of-law rules, some of which give effect to party autonomy and some 
of which apply in the absence and even irrespective of the parties’ choice. 
 
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND INTERNAL ASPECTS OF NETWORKS 1: RELATIONS 
BETWEEN CONTRACTUALLY BOUND NETWORK MEMBERS 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
addition, the rules of jurisdiction in contract and tort are difficult to apply to transnational contractual networks 
whenever the performance of the contract or the harmful event occur in more than one State: see U Grušić, 
‘Jurisdiction in Complex Contracts under the Brussels I Regulation’ (2011) 7 JPIL 321; M Lehmann, ‘Where 
does Economic Loss Occur?’ (2010) 7 JPIL 527. 
28 See Case C-543/10 Refcomp SpA v Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance SA ECLI:EU:C:2013:62, [2013] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 449; Muir Watt (n 10), 362-4. 
29 R Brownsword, ‘Network Contracts Revisited’ in Amstutz and Teubner (eds) (n 11) 31. 
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Relations between the members of a network who are contractually bound to one another are 
classified as contractual in nature, thus falling within the subject-matter scope of Rome I.30 
The basic scheme of this instrument is as follows. There are special choice-of-law rules for 
carriage, consumer, insurance and employment contracts, which are contained in Articles 5-8, 
respectively. The special rules limit the freedom of the parties to choose the applicable law 
and are based on connecting factors that reflect the peculiar features of these contracts. Other 
contracts fall under the general rules of Articles 3 and 4. Article 3 allows the parties to choose 
the applicable law. Article 4 sets out the default choice-of-law rules that are applicable in the 
absence of party autonomy. Finally, Article 9 allows the courts to apply the so-called 
overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum and, under certain conditions, even 
the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country of performance. 
The basic scheme of Rome I raises three questions. Firstly, are the general rules of 
Articles 3 and 4, which apply in the vast majority of cases concerning transnational 
contractual networks, capable of fostering cooperation and coordination in the network? The 
second question pertains to networks (e.g. a credit card transaction and temporary agency 
work) that comprise contracts that fall within the scope of more than one set of choice-of-law 
rules. Can the simultaneous application of more than one set of choice-of-law rules lead to 
network-favourable outcomes? Thirdly, how do overriding mandatory provisions affect the 
objectives of cooperation and coordination? These questions will be addressed in turn. 
 
A. General Choice-of-Law Rules of Rome I and Contractual Networks 
 
                                                 
30 Art 1 Rome I. 
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Having in mind the distinction between procedural and substantive justifications for the 
application of the network concept,31 choice of law by network members and choice of law by 
the default choice-of-law rules will be assessed separately. 
 
1. Choice of law by network members 
 
The parties can choose the legal regime applicable to network relations either directly, i.e. by 
creating or referring to an existing set of rules governing network relations (e.g. produced by 
a transnational trade or business association), or indirectly, i.e. by choosing the applicable law 
that contains rules governing network relations. The difference between the choice of non-
state rules of law and the choice of a national law to govern a contractual relation is well 
known in private international law. Rome I does not acknowledge the choice of a non-state 
body of law as the choice of law governing the contract for the purposes of Article 3. The 
most that the parties can do under Rome I is to incorporate non-state rules of law into their 
contract, which will be given effect to the extent allowed by the national law governing the 
contract.32 In other words, Rome I subscribes to the orthodox view expressed famously by 
Lord Diplock in Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co33 that: 
contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum. They are mere pieces of paper 
devoid of all legal effect unless they were made by reference to some system of 
private law which defines the obligations assumed by the parties to the contract by 
                                                 
31 See text accompanying n 29 above. 
32 See Recital 13 Rome I (‘This Regulation does not preclude parties from incorporating by reference into their 
contract a non-State body of law or an international convention.’). Compare Art 3(2) of the proposal for Rome I, 
COM(2005) 650 final and Art 3 of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial 
Contracts, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No 6 – revised of July 2014. 
33 [1984] AC 50 (HL), 65. 
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their use of particular forms of words and prescribes the remedies enforceable in a 
court of justice for failure to perform any of those obligations. 
The choice of non-state rules of law by the parties will, generally speaking, be given effect 
because of the principle of freedom of contract that is at the heart of modern national systems 
of contract law; but non-state rules of law will be given effect only to the extent to which they 
do not clash with non-derogable rules of the national law that governs the contract. 
The fact that every contract must have a governing national law has important 
consequences for the objectives of cooperation and coordination in the network. Since every 
bilateral contractual relation in a network must be governed by a national law, the risk of 
conflict and contradiction potentially arises whenever the members of a transnational 
contractual network choose a non-state body of law to govern network relations. It should be 
noted in this respect that contractual networks usually take one of the following three forms. 
Firstly, in many networks there is a more or less clear centre, the hub of the network, which 
enters explicit contractual relations with other network members. This type of network is 
organised in a hub and spokes or star pattern. A typical example is a franchise in which the 
franchisor stands at the centre of the network and has direct contractual relations with 
franchisees; franchisees are not bound to one another by express contractual stipulations. 
Secondly, some networks are organised as chains of contracts, for example supply chains. 
Thirdly, there are mixed networks that combine both hub and spokes and chain patterns, such 
as construction contracts. If a network is organised in a chain pattern, the national law that 
governs one bilateral contract that forms part of the network might acknowledge a general 
duty of loyalty towards the network and enable the review of the content of standard form 
contracts entered into between network members, which might include the review of the non-
state body of law chosen to govern network relations. But the national laws that govern 
bilateral contracts up and down the chain might not take the network purpose into account in 
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the interpretation of bilateral contracts that form a network or might contain different, 
conflicting and contradictory rules. This, in turn, might affect the passing of liabilities along 
the chain. A related problem arises in contractual networks that are organised in a hub and 
spokes pattern. The bilateral contracts entered into by the hub of a network might be governed 
by different national laws which might interact in different, conflicting and contradictory 
ways with one other and with the non-state body of law agreed between the hub and nodes to 
govern network relations. Whether conflict and contradiction will in fact arise depends largely 
on whether the bilateral contractual relations that form a network will in fact be governed by 
different national laws, which ultimately depends on the operation of the default choice-of-
law rules. 
Before moving to the assessment of the default choice-of-law rules, the choice of 
national law by the parties to govern network relations should be addressed. Can the members 
of a network achieve the desired unity of applicable law by choosing one national law to 
govern all bilateral contractual relations that form the network or, alternatively, by choosing 
one national law to govern network-related issues? Choice of law by the parties can be either 
express or tacit. An express choice can be made by using the same choice-of-law clause in all 
bilateral contracts or by referring therein to the same document (e.g. a framework agreement) 
that contains a choice-of-law clause in favour of a national law. Tacit or implied choice, on 
the other hand, is a real choice of law that is not expressed in the contract, but is ‘clearly 
demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case’.34 The question 
arises of whether, in cases where some of the bilateral contracts that form a network are silent 
about the applicable law, the courts can infer a choice of law on the ground that another 
network contract contains an express choice of law. Although this situation is not mentioned 
                                                 
34 Art 3(1) Rome I. 
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in the non-exhaustive list of examples of implied choice in the Giuliano-Lagarde Report,35 
there is no reason why a choice of law in a network contract cannot be inferred on the ground 
of an express choice of law in a contract that forms part of the same network. This seems to 
be confirmed by the Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention into a 
Community instrument according to which an implied choice can be found where a contract is 
‘part of a series of operations, the law having been chosen only for the basic contract 
underlying the general operation’.36 Further support for this argument is found in a recent 
empirical study by Penades Fons on the finding of implied choice of law and the use of the 
escape clause in the context of Rome I.37 He demonstrates that the flexible approach by 
English courts to the finding of implied choice is justified as a response to the need to balance 
the multiple policy issues generated by international commercial transactions. Protecting and 
enhancing the efficient operation of transnational contractual networks should be one of the 
goals of European law, including European private international law. The flexible approach to 
the finding of implied choice of law that would lead to the desired unity of applicable law to a 
contractual network should therefore be regarded as justified and in line with the approach of 
the courts to the finding of implied choice.38 But this flexible approach has its limits – it can 
                                                 
35 M Giuliano and P Lagarde, ‘Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ 
[1980] OJ C282/1, para 3 of the comment of Art 3. 
36 European Commission, Green paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation, COM(2002) 654 final, section 
3.2.4.1. 
37 M Penades Fons, ‘Commercial Choice of Law in Context: Looking Beyond Rome’ (2015) 78 MLR 241. 
38 Penades Fons concludes ibid, at p 256, that ‘the application of the doctrine of connected contracts under either 
implied choice or the escape clause is used as a mechanism to enhance the commercial soundness of the 
operation. That is, as an instrument for the unification of the legal order applicable to the plurality of agreements 
constituting a transaction or a chain of transactions.’ English cases on implied choice in related contracts include 
Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 350 (CA) (reinsurance); 
Emeraldian Ltd Partnership v Wellmix Shipping Ltd [2010] EWHC 1411 (Comm), [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 301, 
[170] (guarantee related to a charterparty); FR Lurssen Werft GmbH & Co KG v Halle [2010] EWCA Civ 587, 
[2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 265, [20]-[21] (commission contract related to two shipbuilding contracts); Gard Marine 
and Energy Ltd v Tunnicliffe [2010] EWCA Civ 1052, [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 208, [39]-[45] (reinsurance); 
Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Ltd [2011] EWHC 339 (Comm), [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 215, [23]-[24] 
(guarantee related to a charterparty); Stonebridge Underwriting Ltd v Ontario Municipal Insurance Exchange 
[2010] EWHC 2279 (Comm), [2010] 2 CLC 349, [35] (reinsurance); Golden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar 
Mining Industries Pvt Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 265, [2012] 1 WLR 3674, [45], [49] and [55] (guarantee and 
warranty of authority related to a charterparty); Alliance Bank JSC v Aquanta Corp [2012] EWCA Civ 1588, 
[2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 819, [54] (implied indemnity related to a guarantee); Pathfinder Minerals Plc v Veloso 
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only operate if one or more network contracts are expressly39 subject to one and the same 
national law and does not allow the content of potentially applicable national laws to be taken 
into account. 
But there are at least two problems with the choice of a national law to govern 
network relations.40 First, even if the parties choose – either expressly or tacitly – one national 
law to govern all bilateral contracts that form a network or network-related issues, there is a 
possibility that another law (or laws) will be applied on an overriding basis.41 This issue is 
addressed in sub-section IV.C below. Secondly, it is unclear whether network-related issues 
can be separated from other issues and subjected to one national law. Article 3(1) of Rome I 
allows the parties to split the applicable law (dépeçage).42 However, according to the 
Giuliano-Lagarde Report on the Rome Convention, the choice of more than one law to a 
contract is allowed only if ‘logically consistent, i.e. it must relate to elements in the contract 
which can be governed by different laws without giving rise to contradictions’.43 While 
network-related issues appear capable of being governed by different laws without giving rise 
to logical inconsistencies, this matter has not been authoritatively decided and is therefore 
inherently uncertain. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
[2012] EWHC 2856, [46] (sale of shares in relation to an equity funding agreement); BAT Industries Plc v 
Windward Prospects Ltd [2013] EWHC 4087 (Comm), [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 757, [74] (contract for transfer 
of legal defence in New York litigation and contract for execution of settlement agreement). Compare Gan 
Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 54 (CA) (reinsurance); Tonicstar Ltd 
(Operating as Lloyd’s Syndicate 1861) v American Home Assurance Co [2004] EWHC 1234 (Comm), [2012] 1 
CLC 271, [10] (reinsurance) (in these two cases, there was no implied choice that would achieve the unity of 
applicable law). See further CSA Okoli, ‘The Significance of the Doctrine of Accessory Allocation as a 
Connecting Factor under Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation’ (2013) 9 JPIL 449; Penades Fons ibid, 256-7 and 
268-73. 
39 Giuliano-Lagarde Report (n 35), 17. But see Golden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd 
ibid (choice of law in a contract was implied on the basis of an implied choice of law in a related contract). 
40 Similarly, Cafaggi and Clavel (n 10), 213. 
41 See Arts 9 and 12(2) Rome I. 
42 The third sentence of Art 3(1) provides: ‘By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole 
or to part only of the contract.’ 
43 Giuliano-Lagarde Report (n 35), para 4 of the comment of Art 3. 
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2. Choice of law by the default rules 
 
Where the parties have not chosen a national law to govern a bilateral contract that forms part 
of a network, in the majority of cases it will be necessary to resort to the general default 
choice-of-law rules of Article 4 of Rome I. The structure of this Article is as follows. On the 
one hand, there are fixed choice-of-law rules that determine the governing law for a number 
of nominate contracts and other contracts with an identifiable characteristic performance.44 
There is also an escape clause that allows a departure from the law designated by the fixed 
choice-of-law rules in favour of the law of the country that is manifestly more closely 
connected with the contract in question. If the contract is not one of the nominate contracts for 
which a specific choice-of-law rule is provided or has elements of two or more such nominate 
contracts, and if its characteristic performance cannot be identified, the applicable law will be 
determined through the direct application of the principle of the closest connection. 
It is important to note for the purposes of the present discussion that two of the 
nominate contracts for which specific choice-of-law rules are provided are typical network 
contracts. According to Article 4(1)(e), a franchise contract is governed by the law of the 
franchisee’s habitual residence. Similarly, a distribution contract is governed by the law of the 
distributor’s habitual residence pursuant to Article 4(1)(f). Of importance are also the rules for 
sales and services contracts, which subject these contracts to the law of the country of the 
seller’s/service provider’s habitual residence.45 
                                                 
44 For the theory of characteristic performance see Giuliano-Lagarde Report (n 35), 19; K Lipstein, 
‘Characteristic Performance – A New Concept in the Conflict of Laws in Matters of Contract for the EEC’ 
(1981) 3 Northwestern Journal of International and Business Law 402; HUJ d’Oliveira, ‘”Characteristic 
Obligation” in the Draft EEC Obligation Convention’ (1977) 25 AJCL 303. 
45 Art 4(1)(a) and (b) Rome I. For the distinction between sales and services contract see Case C-381/08 Car 
Trim v KeySafety Systems [2010] ECR I-1255 (on the application of what is now Art 7(1)(b) Brussels I Recast to 
a long-term supply contract between an Italian manufacturer of air bag systems and a German manufacturer of 
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The default choice-of-law rules raise a number of questions. First, why are franchise 
and distribution contracts specifically mentioned in Article 4(1)? Why are there no specific 
choice-of-law rules for other typical network contracts, such as commercial agency contracts, 
construction contracts etc? Secondly, why is the habitual residence of the 
franchisee/distributor adopted as the crucial connecting factor? Thirdly, and most importantly, 
is Article 4 as a whole capable of leading to network-friendly outcomes? 
The proposal for Rome I offers the following explanation for the origin of the specific 
choice-of-law rules for franchise and distribution contracts: ‘Regarding the solutions for the 
different categories of contracts, only those proposed [for franchise and distribution contracts] 
have come up for discussion and prompted court decisions in the Member States in relation to 
determination of the characteristic performance.’46 The specific choice-of-law rules for 
franchise and distribution contracts were, therefore, introduced in order to enhance legal 
certainty with respect to these two types of contract that were perceived as particularly 
problematic. There are no special rules for other typical network contracts, which are 
therefore governed by the law of the country of the habitual residence of the party who 
provides the characteristic performance.47 Since the characteristic performance will not be 
identifiable in many cases of network contracts, the applicable law will often be determined 
by the direct application of the principle of the closest connection. 
There is a degree of confusion with regard to the reasons for according the habitual 
residence of the franchisee/distributor the status of the crucial connecting factor. According to 
the proposal for Rome I: ‘The solutions are based on the fact that Community law seeks to 
                                                                                                                                                        
components); Case C-9/12 Corman-Collins SA v La Maison du Whiskey SA ECLI:EU:C:2013:860, [2014] QB 
431 (on the application of what is now Art 7(1) Brussels I Recast to a distribution agreement). 
46 (n 32), 6. For diverging case law on the determination of the characteristic performance of franchise and 
distribution contracts see Garcia Gutierrez (n 10), 234-6; Ancel (n 10), 223-6. 
47 See Recital 19 Rome I which states that, in the case of a contract consisting of a bundle of rights and 
obligations capable of being categorized as falling within more than one of the specified types of contract, the 
characteristic performance of the contract should be determined having regard to its centre of gravity.  
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protect the franchisee and the distributor as the weaker parties.’48 But this explanation is not 
entirely satisfactory. A feature of contractual networks is that they create a set of complex 
relations where the interaction, interdependence and cooperation of all network members is 
crucial. As the theoretical model of symbiotic contracts demonstrates,49 both franchise and 
distribution contracts are characterised by the existence of double, cross-over principal and 
agent relations. This leads to the situation where franchisor and franchisee (as well as 
manufacturer and distributor) are dependent on each other for the success of the network. 
Although it is true that in many franchise and distribution networks the franchisor and the 
manufacturer, as network hubs, enjoy a position of power and domination, this is by no means 
the case for all such networks.50 Indeed, this explanation for adopting the habitual residence 
of the franchisee/distributor as the crucial connecting factor is not mentioned in the recitals of 
Rome I. Furthermore, scholars who have written about the default choice-of-law rules of 
Article 4(1) do not accept the rationale of protection as the sole explanation, but also advance 
the argument that the adoption of these connecting factors leads to the application of the law 
of the country most affected by the performance of franchise and distribution contracts.51 This 
leads us to the third question, namely whether Article 4 as a whole is capable of leading to 
network-friendly outcomes. 
The focus of the fixed choice-of-law rules of Article 4 is on discrete, bilateral 
contractual relations. This narrow perspective limited the options of the drafters of Rome I to 
the laws of habitual residences of the two parties to such a relation. Consequently, the fact 
that a contractual relation might form part of a contractual network was not sufficiently taken 
into account during the drafting of the fixed choice-of-law rules. This is confirmed by the 
                                                 
48 (n 32), 6. 
49 See text accompanying n 17 above. 
50 See WL Killion, ‘The Modern Myth of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case for a More Balanced View of the 
Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship’ (2008) 28 Franchise Law Journal 23. 
51 Ancel (n 10), 226-7; Garcia Gutierrez (n 10), 238-40; M McParland, The Rome I Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (OUP, 2015), [10.236] (but see [10.224]). 
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quote from the proposal for Rome I concerning the origin of the specific choice-of-law rules 
for franchise and distribution contracts.52 Since the determination of the characteristic 
performance for these two types of contract had proven problematic under the Rome 
Convention, the drafters of Rome I aimed to introduce legal certainty in the choice-of-law 
process by giving preference to the habitual residence of the franchisee/distributor over that of 
the franchisor/manufacturer. Nothing is said – either in the proposal for Rome I or in the 
recitals of Rome I – about the network context in which these two types of contract typically 
operate. But the focus on discrete, bilateral contractual relations is unsuitable for contractual 
networks because it disregards their organisational, company-like features and the fact that the 
network as a whole is more than the sum of its constituent parts and bilateral contractual 
relations entered among them. The consequence of the focus on discrete, bilateral contractual 
relations is that transnational contractual networks are routinely subjected to the regulatory 
authority of multiple States, which creates the risk of conflict and contradiction. The only 
exception seems to be provided by Article 4(1)(h) dealing with certain financial agreements 
which emphasises the need for multiple contracts to be ‘governed by a single law’.53 
Can the escape clause of Article 4(4) be used to achieve the desired unity of applicable 
law in situations where the fixed choice-of-law rules lead to the fragmentation of the 
network? In order to answer this question, it is useful to refer again to the recent empirical 
study conducted by Penades Fons, who concludes that the flexibility inherent in the escape 
clause has been and can be legitimately used to balance the multiple policy issues generated 
by international commercial transactions.54 There are strong reasons why European law, 
including European private international law, should protect and enhance the efficiency of 
transnational contractual networks. Therefore, the use of the escape clause as a tool for 
                                                 
52 n 46 above. 
53 See also Recital 29. 
54 (n 37). 
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achieving network-friendly outcomes is justified.55 This is supported by Recital 20 of Rome I, 
which demonstrates that the drafters of this instrument had envisaged utilising the escape 
clause for the purpose of achieving the unity of applicable law. In applying the escape clause, 
‘account should be taken, inter alia, of whether the contract in question has a very close 
relationship with another contract or contracts’.56 Furthermore, the CJEU has confirmed in 
Haeger & Schmidt GmbH v Mutuelles du Mans assurances IARD (MMA IARD) and others57 
that in applying the escape clause ‘the presence of a close connection between the contract in 
question with another contract or contracts which are, as the case may be, part of the same 
chain of contracts’ is to be taken into account. 
An example of how the escape clause can be used to achieve network-friendly 
outcomes is provided by the leading English case on choice of law for letters of credit, Bank 
of Baroda v Vysya Bank,58 decided under the Rome Convention. Here, the underlying contract 
for the sale of goods was between an Irish seller, acting though its London office, and an 
Indian buyer. The buyer had contracted with an Indian bank (Vysya) to issue a letter of credit. 
Vysya, in turn, contracted with another Indian bank (Baroda) for the latter to confirm the 
letter of credit. The addition and honouring of the confirmation of the credit was to be 
                                                 
55 Similarly, S Atril, ‘Choice of Law in Contract: The Missing Pieces of the Article 4 Jigsaw’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 
549, in particular 558-9; R Fentiman, ‘Commercial Expectations and the Rome Convention’ (2002) 61 CLJ 50; 
R Fentiman, ‘Choice of Law in Europe: Uniformity and Integration’ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 2021, 2048; 
R Fentiman, ‘The Significance of the Closest Connection’ in J Ahern and W Binchy (eds), The Rome II 
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 
85, 94-7; R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (OUP, 2010), [4.108], [4.110]-[4.121]. See also 
Ministry of Justice, ‘Rome I – Should the UK Opt In’, Consultation Paper CP05/08 of 2 April 2008, [54] (‘in the 
context of related contracts … it is of commercial importance for a single law to be applied to the whole 
transaction rather than having different laws applying to each of the component parts of the transaction’, 
emphasis added). 
56 See also Recital 21 which refers to the existence of related contracts as a relevant factor for the direct 
application of the principle of the closest connection. 
57 Case C-305/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2320, [49]. 
58 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 87 (QB). Other leading English cases on choice of law for letters of credit include 
Offshore International SA v Banco Central SA [1977] 1 WLR 399 (QB); Power Curber International Ltd v 
National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 1 WLR 1233 (CA); European Asian Bank AG v Punjab and Sind Bank 
[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 651 (QB); Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong Kong Ltd v Sonali Bank [1995] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 227 (QB); Marconi Communications International Ltd v Pt Pan Indonesia Bank TBK [2005] EWCA Civ 
422, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 72. See also C Hare, ‘The Rome Convention and Letters of Credit’ [2005] LMCLQ 
417; CGJ Morse, ‘Letters of Credit and the Rome Convention’ [1994] LMCLQ 560. 
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effected in England, through the confirming bank’s London office. Letters of credit give rise 
to a number of autonomous contracts between different parties that constitute a ‘mini’ 
contractual network. In Baroda v Vysya, the court considered four contractual relationships: 
1) the contract between the buyer and the issuing bank; 2) the contract between the issuing 
bank and the confirming bank; 3) the contract between the confirming bank and the seller; 
and 4) the contract between the issuing bank and the seller. The confirming bank had paid the 
seller in England and sought reimbursement from the issuing bank. After the issuing bank had 
refused to pay, the confirming bank commenced proceedings in England. The issue of the 
applicable law was crucial because the claimant argued that the English courts had 
jurisdiction because the contract between it and the issuing bank was governed by English 
law.59 
The court found that the choice-of-law rule of Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention, 
which was based on the theory of characteristic performance, pointed to the application of 
Indian law to relationships 1) and 4) and to the application of English law to relationships 2) 
and 3). After noting that this situation involves a ‘wholly undesirable multiplicity of 
potentially conflicting laws’,60 Mance J inquired whether the escape clause of Article 4(5) of 
the Rome Convention could lead to the unity of applicable law. In his view: 
In the present case the application of Article 4(2) would lead to an irregular and 
subjective position where the governing law of a letter of credit would vary according 
to whether one was looking at the position of the confirming or the issuing bank. It is 
of great importance to both beneficiaries and banks concerned in the issue and 
operation of international letters of credit that there should be clarity and simplicity in 
                                                 
59 See para 3.1(6)(c) Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 6B. 
60 [1994] CLC 41 (QB), 48. 
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such matters. Article 4(5) provides the answer. The Rome Convention was not 
intended to confuse legal relationships or to disrupt normal expectations … 
The present situation provides in my judgment a classic demonstration of the need for 
and appropriateness of Article 4(5).61 
The outcome was that the letter of credit was governed by the same law, English law, as 
between the banks and the beneficiary and each of the banks.62 
But the escape clause of Article 4(4) of Rome I is a blunt tool that cannot routinely 
lead to network-favourable outcomes. The main reason is that it is supposed to operate in 
exceptional circumstances only, where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that 
the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated by 
the fixed choice-of-law rules.63 The fact that the contract in question forms part of a network 
is unlikely in and of itself to be enough to trigger the application of the escape clause. 
Moreover, the escape clause does not allow an issue-by-issue choice-of-law analysis and only 
takes into account the territorial connections that the contract in question has with different 
jurisdictions. The fact that a certain issue – but not the contract as a whole – is manifestly 
                                                 
61 Ibid, 49. 
62 Other English cases on the use of the escape clause to determine the applicable law of related contracts include 
Lincoln National Life Insurance Co v Employers Reinsurance Corp [2002] EWHC 28 (Comm), [2002] Lloyd’s 
Rep I.R. 853, [23]-[25] (reinsurance); Emeraldian Ltd Partnership v Wellmix Shipping Ltd (n 38), [171] 
(guarantee related to a charterparty); Gard Marine and Energy Ltd v Tunnicliffe (n 38), [46]-[47] (reinsurance); 
British Arab Commercial Bank Plc v Bank of Communications [2011] EWHC 281 (Comm), [2011] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 664, [32]-[35] (counter-guarantee); Golden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd (n 38), 
[49]-[54] (warranty of authority related to a charterparty); Alliance Bank JSC v Aquanta Corp (n 38), [54] 
(implied indemnity related to a guarantee); BAT Industries Plc v Windward Prospects Ltd (n 38), [74] (contract 
for transfer of legal defence in New York litigation and contract for execution of settlement agreement). 
Compare Credit Lyonnais v New Hampshire Insurance Co Ltd [1997] CLC 909 (CA) (insurance; the applicable 
law was determined under the choice-of-law rules of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 which were influenced 
by the Rome Convention); Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contractors SAE v Land Rover Exports Ltd [2001] 
EWCA Civ 2019, [2002] CLC 533 (guarantee related to a distribution contract); Caledonia Subsea Ltd v 
Microperi Srl 2002 SLT 1022 (sub-contracting); Dornoch Ltd v Mauritius Union Assurance Co Ltd [2006] 
EWCA Civ 389, [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 385, [40]-[43] (reinsurance) (in these four cases, the escape clause 
was not (specifically) used to achieve the unity of applicable law). See further Okoli (n 38); Penades Fons (n 37), 
256-7 and 268-73. 
63 See Z Tang, ‘Law Applicable in the Absence of Choice – The New Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation’ (2008) 
71 MLR 785, 797-800. 
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more closely connected with a particular country cannot trigger the application of the escape 
clause. The content of potentially applicable laws, i.e. whether or not they have adequate rules 
for network-related issues, is irrelevant for the purposes of applying the escape clause. These 
are also the reasons why the direct application of the principle of the closest connection (in 
situations where the contract is not one of the nominate contracts for which a specific choice-
of-law rule is provided or has elements of two or more such nominate contracts, and its 
characteristic performance cannot be identified) is unlikely to lead routinely to network-
favourable outcomes. 
There are several ways in which Article 4 of Rome I could be made more suitable for 
dealing with contractual networks. The main problem with this Article is that it focuses on 
discrete, bilateral contractual relations. The organisational, company-like features of 
contractual networks are not sufficiently taken into account. It is important to note here that 
relations within corporations are typically subjected to one law only. The unity of applicable 
law for company law issues is achieved in some countries through the application of the law 
of the company’s seat and in others through the application of the law of the company’s place 
of incorporation.64 Rome I should give more weight to the organisational aspects of 
contractual networks. Networks that are organised in a hub and spokes pattern, in particular, 
could be subjected by default to the law of the country of the network centre. But there should 
also be enough flexibility to allow the application, where appropriate, of the law of the 
country of the network node to accommodate the flexibility that is inherent in networks. This 
would require relatively minor changes to Rome I, e.g. the amendment of the choice-of-law 
rules for franchise and distribution contracts that would make the law of the habitual 
residence of the franchisor/distributor applicable by default and an introduction of analogous 
rules for other kinds of contracts that typically form networks that are organised in a hub and 
                                                 
64 See S. Rammeloo, Corporations in Private International Law: A European Perspective (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
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spokes pattern (e.g. commercial agency networks). Furthermore, the escape clause could be 
made more flexible by either omitting the requirement for a ‘clear’ ‘manifestly’ closer 
connection in cases involving contractual networks65 or at least by clarifying in the Recitals 
that the escape clause should be used flexibly not only in the context of connected contracts 
entered into between the same two parties, but also in the context of connected contracts 
entered into between different parties within a contractual network.66 This could be combined 
with a rule that would allow the splitting of the applicable law (dépeçage) in appropriate 
circumstances (e.g. where it is appropriate to have some issues governed by the law of the 
network centre and other issues by the law of the network node).67 However, even with these 
changes, the general default choice-of-law rules of Rome I would struggle to routinely lead to 
network-favourable outcomes for many types of contractual networks, in particular those 
organised in a chain or mixed pattern. 
Another way of improving Article 4 would be to accept the proposal put forward by 
Cafagi and Clavel for a functional choice of law.68 Under this proposal, the escape clause 
should be used, in the context of contractual networks, to select the law whose content is, 
from a functional point of view, the most consistent with the network purpose. This 
methodology would take into account not only the various territorial contacts that a network 
contract has with different jurisdictions, but also the content of potentially applicable laws 
with respect to network-related issues. However, this proposal clashes with the orthodox view 
that only territorial connections between a contract and different jurisdictions can be taken 
                                                 
65 See the escape clause of Art 4(5) of the Rome Convention. 
66 It is unclear whether the existing Recital 20 of Rome I is supposed to apply only in the former or also in the 
latter situation. 
67 For example, Art 4(1) of the Rome Convention, after stating that the contract shall be governed by the law of 
the country with which it is most closely connected, provided as follows: ‘Nevertheless, a severable part of the 
contract which has a closer connection with another country may by way of exception be governed by the law of 
that other country.’ 
68 (n 10), 226, 228, 243-4. 
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into account under the escape clause69 and is therefore, despite its merits, unlikely to gain 
much support. 
 
B. Interaction between the General and Special Choice-of-Law Rules of Rome I and 
Contractual Networks 
 
Some contractual networks engage simultaneously the general and special choice-of-law rules 
of Rome I. In a credit card transaction,70 for example, relations between the consumer, on the 
one hand, and the retailer and the lender, on the other, will often fall within the scope of the 
special private international rules for consumer contracts.71 Relations between the retailer and 
the lender fall within the scope of the general rules. In temporary agency work,72 to take 
another example, relations between the worker, on the one hand, and the agency and the end-
user, on the other, usually fall within the personal scope of some pieces of labour legislation 
and also within the scope of the special private international law rules for employment 
                                                 
69 See Case C-64/12 Anton Schlecker v Melitta Josefa Boedeker, the Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:241, [2014] QB 320, [21]. 
70 Heermann mentions a credit card transaction as an example of a ‘mini’ contractual network: PW Heermann, 
‘The Status of Multilateral Synallagmas in the Law of Connected Contracts’ in Amstutz and Teubner (eds) (n 
11) 103. It should be noted that Teubner’s concept of connected contracts, through which he conceptualises in 
legal terms contractual networks, has its root in Art 358 of the German Civil Code (BGB) which is concerned 
with the particular problems of consumers’ withdrawal from contracts entered into using a credit arrangement 
with the bank and the retailer. 
71 The personal scope of the special choice-of-law rules for consumer contracts is determined by Art 6 of Rome 
I. These rules apply only where the professional (a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the 
country where the consumer has his habitual residence, or (b) by any means, directs such activities to that 
country or to several countries including that country, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 
There is also a list of situations in which the application of Art 6 is excluded. 
72 Collins advances strong reasons to treat the parties to a temporary agency work relation as forming part of a 
network: Collins (n 2), 7, 59-62 and 65. 
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contracts.73 Relations between the agency and the end-user fall within the scope of the general 
rules. 
Can the simultaneous application of the general and the special choice-of-law rules 
lead to network-favourable outcomes? The special rules are characterised by the fact that they 
restrict party autonomy and are based on connecting factors that reflect the peculiar features 
of the covered contractual relations. For example, in contracts involving consumers and 
employees, party autonomy is limited with the aim of protecting the weaker party.74 Thus, the 
professional and the employer cannot deprive the weaker party, by means of choice of law, of 
the protection afforded to the latter by the mandatory rules of the law applicable in the 
absence of choice. The law applicable in the absence of choice for consumer contracts is 
determined by an inflexible choice-of-law rule, which points to the law of the consumer’s 
habitual residence.75 Employment contracts are governed by the law of the habitual place of 
work, although there is a possibility of applying the law of another country that is more 
closely connected with the contract.76 
A consumer typically enters into contract with the retailer and the lender in the 
country where he or she is habitually resident. In this situation, the special choice-of-law rules 
will lead to the application of the same law to relations between the consumer and the other 
two parties. Since the gravity of this ‘mini’ contractual network is clearly in the country of the 
consumer’s habitual residence, there is a strong reason to apply the escape clause in cases 
where the retailer and the lender have not exercised their party autonomy in order to achieve 
the application of the law of the country of the consumer’s habitual residence also to relations 
                                                 
73 The special choice-of-law rules for employment contracts apply to ‘individual employment contracts’: Art 8. 
For an examination of the personal scope of these rules see U Grušić, The European Private International Law 
of Employment (CUP, 2015), Ch 3 and Case C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV v Spies von Büllesheim 
ECLI: EU:C:2015:574, [2015] IL Pr 44. 
74 See Recital 23 Rome I. 
75 Art 6 Rome I. 
76 Art 8 Rome I. 
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between the retailer and the lender. However, there are situations where relations between the 
consumer and the other two parties do not fall within the scope of the special choice-of-law 
rules for consumer contracts, in which case the relation(s) outside the scope of the special 
rules engage the application of the general choice-of-law rules. In these situations, and for the 
reasons mentioned in the previous sub-section, the choice-of-law rules of Rome I will struggle 
to routinely achieve the desired unity of applicable law. 
The special choice-of-law rules for employment contracts seem incapable of leading 
systematically to the unity of applicable law whenever a worker who is hired by an agency in 
one country is posted to work for end-users in different countries. In this situation, the special 
choice-of-law rules are likely to lead to the fragmentation of the network,77 with all the risk of 
conflict and contradiction that this creates. 
 
C. Rome I, Overriding Mandatory Provisions and Contractual Networks 
 
Overriding mandatory provisions are defined as provisions the respect for which is regarded 
as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling 
within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract.78 Many 
provisions concerning contractual networks fall into this category. For example, the CJEU has 
held that the rules of the Commercial Agents Directive, which regulate certain aspects of 
                                                 
77 For the application of Art 8 of Rome I to posting of workers abroad by employment agencies see Grušić (n 
73), section 5.3. See also ibid, Ch 8, on the posting of workers in Europe. 
78 Art 9(1) Rome I. 
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commercial agency networks, are of this nature.79 So are potentially many rules on franchise 
and distribution networks80 and construction contracts.81 Furthermore, ‘mini’ contractual 
networks such as credit card transactions and temporary agency work involve relations that 
often fall within the scope of consumer and employment protection legislation, which is 
typically considered as overridingly mandatory in many Member States.82 
If a legal relationship falls within the scope of an overriding mandatory provision, that 
provision will typically mandate its application regardless of the law that governs the 
relationship under the choice-of-law rules. Rome I allows the application of the overriding 
mandatory provision of the law of the forum and, under certain conditions, of the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the country of performance.83 However, if a legal relationship takes 
place within the EU internal market, the overriding application of mandatory rules is allowed 
only if it is in accordance with substantive European law.84 In other words, the overriding 
application of mandatory rules that represents a restriction of a fundamental economic 
freedom is allowed only if it is non-discriminatory, justified and proportionate. 
                                                 
79 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-9305. See also Case C-
184/12 United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, 
[2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 161. 
80 See, for example, statutes enacted in the United States addressing what has been perceived as abuses of the 
relations of power and domination in network contracts in certain market sectors: EU Federal Trade Commission 
Rule: Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures 16 
CFR pt 436; California Franchise Investment Law (1971); Delaware Franchise Security Law (1970); New Jersey 
Franchise Practices Act (1971); US Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 15 USC ss 2801-2806; US Automobile 
Dealers Day in Court Act 15 USC ss 1221-1225. 
81 See the decisions of the French Cour de cassation (Ch Mixte, 30 November 2007, pourvoi n 06-14006; Cass 
Civ 3, 30 January 2008, pourvoi n 06-14641; Cass Civ 3, 8 April 2008 pourvoi n 07-10763), holding that the 
French law No 75-1334 of 1975, which recognises an action directe among non-contracting network members, 
is an overriding mandatory provision whenever the contract is for the construction of an immoveable in France. 
See also P Piroddi, ‘The French Plumber, Subcontracting, and the Internal Market’ (2008) 10 YBPIL 593 and P. 
Roscher, ‘Forty Years On: French Law on Sub-Contracting’ (2015) 32 International Construction Law Review 
44. 
82 For the overriding nature of English consumer and employment protection legislation see: Office of Fair 
Trading v Lloyds TSB Bank plc and others [2007] UKHL 48, [2008] 1 AC 316 and Serco Ltd v Lawson; Botham 
(FC) v Ministry of Defence; Crofts v Veta Ltd [2006] UKHL 3, [2006] 1 All ER 823; for a critical view of these 
cases see C Bisping, ‘Avoid the Statutist Trap: The International Scope of the Consumer Credit Act’ (2012) 8 
JPIL 35 and Grušić (n 73), Ch 6. 
83 Arts 9(2) and 9(3) Rome I. 
84 See M Fallon and J Meeusen, ‘Private International Law in the European Union and the Exception of Mutual 
Recognition’ (2002) 4 YBPIL 37. See also Case C-184/12 United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v 
Navigation Maritime Bulgare (n 79). 
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The overriding application of mandatory rules will sometimes contribute positively to 
the regulation of transnational contractual networks, in particular where a dominant network 
member imposes on other network members the application of a law that is not particularly 
closely connected with the bilateral relations within the network and does not take into 
account the network purpose. But in the majority of cases the existence of provisions that 
apply to networks in an overriding manner will increase the risk of conflict and contradiction 
by creating or exacerbating the problem of application of multiple laws to transnational 
contractual networks. Accordingly, the potential undermining of the objectives of network 
regulation should be one of the factors to be taken into account when deciding on the 
application of overriding mandatory rules. 
 
V. CHOICE OF LAW AND INTERNAL ASPECTS OF NETWORKS 2: RELATIONS 
BETWEEN NETWORKS MEMBERS NOT IN A DIRECT CONTRACTUAL RELATION 
 
Relations between network members who are not directly connected by bonds of contract are 
classified as non-contractual in European private international law, thus falling within the 
scope of Rome II. This has been confirmed in a number of cases concerning the scope of 
application of Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast and their predecessors, starting 
with the case of Jakob Handte that involved an action directe under French law between sub-
contractors.85 
Rome II lays down a number of choice-of-law rules for different types of non-
contractual obligations, namely torts/delicts, unjust enrichment, agency without authority 
(negotiorum gestio) and pre-contractual liability (culpa in contrahendo). Liability claims 
                                                 
85 (n 27). For a different view see Piroddi (n 10), 322-3. 
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between network members not bound to one another by express contracts are typically 
conceived in national legal systems as claims in tort for the compensation of economic loss. 
Choice-of-law issues raised by such claims fall under the choice-of-law rules for torts of 
Rome II. 
Rome II contains one general choice-of-law rule for torts and a number of special 
choice-of-law rules for product liability, unfair competition and acts restricting free 
competition, environmental damage, infringement of IP rights and industrial action. Although 
there are situations involving transnational contractual networks that may trigger the 
application of the special choice-of-law rules, the vast majority of networks give rise to 
relations that fall under the general choice-of-law rule of Article 4, which is the focus of the 
text that follows. 
Article 4 contains two choice-of-law rules and one escape clause. Article 4(1) 
provides that the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is the law 
of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the 
indirect consequences of that event occur. Article 4(2) further provides that where the person 
claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in 
the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply. 
Finally, there is an escape clause in Article 4(3), which allows the departure from the 
applicable laws designated by the preceding two provisions in favour of the law of the 
country that is manifestly more closely connected with the tort in question. In addition, 
Article 14 provides for party autonomy. The parties are free to choose the applicable law after 
the event giving rise to the damage has occurred. The parties can also choose the applicable 
law ex ante, but only if all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity and the agreement is 
freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred. Finally, Article 16 
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allows the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum and Article 17 
provides that, in assessing a defendant’s conduct regard shall be had to rules of safety and 
conduct in force where the event causing damage occurred. 
As is clear from this brief description of the choice-of-law rules for torts of Rome II, 
the basic scheme adopted by this instrument (party autonomy – general and special choice-of-
law rules – fixed choice-of-law rules and escape clauses – overriding mandatory provisions) 
is essentially the same as that of Rome I. So are the fundamental problems created by the 
State-centricity and the focus on discrete, bilateral relations in a network and territoriality of 
the two instruments. This sub-section will highlight some problems that are peculiar to Rome 
II, such as the determination of the ‘country in which the damage occurs’ in the case of 
economic torts and the application of the escape clause of Article 4(3). 
Relations between network members not bound by express contracts are classified as 
non-contractual, potentially giving rise to claims for compensation for economic loss. 
According to Article 4(1), the law applicable to such non-contractual relations is the law of 
the country in which the direct damage occurs. The main problem with the application of 
Article 4(1) in the context of contractual networks is the fact that the place in which economic 
loss occurs is ‘notoriously hard to locate’.86 According to Lehmann, who dealt with this issue 
through the examination of five case studies (economic loss for misleading information; false 
prospectuses and financial statements; mismanagement of assets; breach of statutory duties; 
inducing an unfavourable contract), the location of economic loss should be determined 
differently for the following types of loss: loss of a distinguishable and locatable asset; loss 
which involves a wilful transfer of money by the victim to another account; loss which 
includes a fortuitous transfer of funds through a number of different accounts; cases where the 
loss cannot be attributed to only one country; and the loss caused by an unfavourable 
                                                 
86 Lehmann (n 27), 531. 
37 
 
contract.87 Even without describing in detail the application of Article 4(1) to these types of 
economic loss, it should be clear that the law applicable to non-contractual relations within a 
network is hard to ascertain and, furthermore, that there are no guarantees that Article 4(1) 
will lead to the application of a law that is strongly connected with the non-contractual 
relation in question. An important aspect of the application of the general choice-of-law rule 
of Article 4, in the context of contractual networks, is therefore the operation of the escape 
clause. 
The escape clause of Article 4(3) of Rome II is worded identically to that of Article 
4(4) of Rome I. Accordingly, everything that is mentioned in sub-section IV.A.2 above is also 
of relevance here. But there is one difference between the two Articles, namely the fact that 
the escape clause of Article 4(3) of Rome II expressly mentions one example of a manifestly 
closer connection that is relevant for the present discussion. It is stated that a manifestly closer 
connection ‘might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, 
such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question’. This rule is 
known as the accessory choice-of-law rule and is designed to lead to the unity of applicable 
law in cases that give rise to concurrent causes of action in choice-of-law.88 The accessory 
choice-of-law rule is designed for situations where contractual and non-contractual 
obligations arise simultaneously between two parties. But the underlying objective of unity of 
applicable law applies equally to transnational contractual networks that give rise to a host of 
related contractual and non-contractual relations between different parties89 and this is 
something that could be clarified in the recitals of Rome II. In any event, due to the 
                                                 
87 Ibid, 541-9. 
88 See PE Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 240-7. 
89 But see A Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (OUP, 2014), [8.105] (‘In more complex cases, 
of course, which arise where the commercial relationship comprises a number of linked contracts and a number 
of associated contracting parties, this analysis may be more difficult and not for the faint-hearted. It is submitted, 
however, that the court should start first from principles. If the gist of the tort, as pleaded, could just as easily 
have been put forward as a claim for breach of a particular contract, it is not helpful to look beyond it to the 
broader contractual matrix to complicate the application of Article 4(3).’) 
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limitations inherent in the escape clauses of the two Rome Regulations, namely the fact that 
they are designed to operate in exceptional circumstances only, that they do not allow an 
issue-by-issue choice-of-law analysis and that they do not allow the taking into account of the 
content of potentially applicable laws, it cannot be expected that network-favourable 
outcomes will be routinely achieved.90 
 
VI. INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF NETWORKS 
 
A key problem concerning contractual networks relates to the responsibility for harm caused 
by the network to third parties. The question is whether, in situations where a third party 
suffers harm as a result of the activities of a network, that third party can obtain compensation 
not only from the network member to which it was directly exposed but also from the network 
as a whole or at least from the network members who participated in the generation and 
realisation of risk. Although scholars have been pleading for more responsibility in external 
network relations,91 national legal systems are slow to impose direct duties between network 
members not directly exposed to third parties and third party victims. The problem is 
exacerbated in the context of transnational contractual networks because they are spread 
across State boundaries, often across several continents, and are connected to multiple laws 
                                                 
90 Muir Watt (n 10) has advanced, at pp 366-7, another solution for achieving network-favourable outcomes in 
this context. According to her, the existence of reciprocal actions among network participants will induce or 
enhance cooperation. ‘This could perfectly well be attained by means of the method and approach implemented 
by the 1973 Hague Convention on the law applicable to product liability, now replaced by Rome II Regulation 
(Article 5). Put simply, the conflict rule ensures the application of a single law in the relation between actors at 
the two ends of the chain. This approach is particularly fitting because an essential element of the network is that 
it mandates not to distinguish between contractual and non-contractual relationships among participants, and 
encourages their equal treatment in terms of the access to rights and allocation of duties.’ (footnote omitted) 
91 See Teubner (n 2), Ch 6. See also H Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex 
Patterns of Economic Integration’ (1990) 53 MLR 731; O. De Schutter, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool 
for Improving the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational Corporations’, available at 
http://cridho.uclouvain.be/documents/Working.Papers/ExtraterrRep22.12.06.pdf, 45-46. 
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with potentially conflicting and contradictory contents. The question for private international 
law is whether, and how, it can help regulate such networks by countering the external risks 
that they generate. 
Reports from different corners of the world of appalling human rights and 
environmental practices and of breaches of labour and consumer standards by members of 
transnational contractual networks often fill the headlines.92 Much of these violations of 
human rights, environmental, labour and consumer protection laws are the result of external 
risks generated by transnational contractual networks. In order to ascertain the role of private 
international law in countering such risks, this section will focus on cases of alleged gross 
human rights and environmental violations that have been committed by members of 
transnational networks. To keep the discussion within manageable bounds, the following text 
will focus on the cases of this type brought in the UK courts. The focus on the UK is justified 
because this country is arguably the second leading centre (after the United States) for the 
litigation of claims brought by oversees victims of alleged gross human rights and 
environmental violations. Given that most of the rules concerning international litigation in 
the UK are of European law origin, the following discussion is also relevant for other Member 
States of the EU. 
The cases of alleged gross human rights and environmental violations that have been 
brought in the UK typically exhibit the following characteristics. Victims, usually from a 
developing country, suffer an infringement of their fundamental human rights (e.g. right to 
life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security, respect for private and family life and 
home, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, free trial, social and 
economic rights etc.) or a degradation of their environment, leading to a personal injury or 
property damage, which is the result of the activities of an overseas subsidiary of a 
                                                 
92 See http://business-humanrights.org/, where many cases have been reported. 
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transnational corporation. The victims commence proceedings in the UK against the parent 
company over which the UK courts have adjudicatory jurisdiction, sometimes joining the 
overseas subsidiary to the proceedings. The claims are typically advanced in tort, e.g. 
negligence, battery, assault and false imprisonment etc., on the basis that the parent company 
owed a direct duty of care to the victims or, much less frequently, on the basis of the piercing 
of the corporate veil that separates the parent and the subsidiary. 
More specifically, cases that have been brought in the UK concerned the rights of the 
victims of asbestos,93 uranium,94 mercury95 and silicosis96 poisoning in South African and 
Namibian mines and factories; the rights of Peruvian environmental protesters who had been 
allegedly unlawfully imprisoned, tortured and sexually abused by police at a copper mine 
owned by a local subsidiary of a transnational corporation;97 the rights of Colombian farmers 
against British Petroleum for damage to their land, crops and animals allegedly caused by the 
construction of an oil pipeline in Colombia;98 the rights of victims of fly-tipped toxic waste in 
Abidjan, Ivory Coast;99 the rights of Tanzanian villagers who had been allegedly killed or 
injured by security guards and police at a mine owned by a local subsidiary of a transnational 
corporation;100 the rights of Cambodian villagers arguably violently evicted from their lands 
and relocated involuntarily to make room for a sugar plantation against a transnational 
                                                 
93 Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (HL) (on forum non conveniens); Durham v T&N Plc, Court of Appeal, 
01 May 1996, unreported. 
94 Connelly v RTZ Corp Plc (No 2) [1998] AC 854 (HL) (on forum non conveniens). 
95 Ngcobo v Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd [1995] TLR 579 (CA) (on the striking out of the defendant’s notice of 
appeal against a refusal to stay proceedings); Sithole v Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd [1999] TLR 110 (CA) (on 
the setting aside of a default judgment and stay of proceedings). 
96 See Vava v Anglo American South Africa Ltd [2012] EWHC 1969 (QB), [2013] Bus LR D48 and [2013] 
EWHC 2131 (QB), [2013] Bus LR D65 (both cases concerned the domicile of the defendant for the purposes of 
the Brussels I Regulation). 
97 See Guerrero v Monterrico Metals Plc [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB) (on disclosure and freezing orders) and 
[2010] EWHC 3228 (QB) (on the amendment of particulars of claim). 
98 See Arroyo v Equion Energia Ltd (Formerly BP Exploration Co (Colombia) Ltd) [2013] EWHC 3173 (TCC) 
(on permission to include a claim for general damages); see also http://business-humanrights.org/en/bp-lawsuits-
re-casanare-colombia. 
99 See Motto v Trafigura Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1150, [2012] 1 WLR 657 (on the proportionality of a bill of 
costs). 
100 See Kesabo v African Barrick Gold Plc [2013] EWHC 4045 (QB) (on costs arising out of an application for 
an anti-suit injunction). 
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corporation;101 the rights of Nigerian fishermen in relation to oil spills from Shell’s Trans-
Niger Pipeline;102 and the rights of Zambian villagers in relation to water pollution allegedly 
caused by a local subsidiary of a transnational corporation.103 
The mentioned cases exhibit one characteristic of importance for the present 
discussion. Virtually all the cases concerned transnational organisational networks, i.e. 
corporate groups.104 This is not because transnational contractual networks do not generate 
significant risks for human rights and the environment. This is arguably because it is very 
hard, indeed virtually impossible in many cases, for victims of alleged gross violations of 
human rights and the environment committed overseas by a member of a transnational 
contractual network to access justice in the UK.105 This is for at least two reasons, both of 
which concern litigation funding. Before proceeding further, it should be noted that such 
victims are not entitled to legal aid in the UK and typically have to obtain representation on a 
no-win no-fee basis in order to commence proceedings in this country, given their typical lack 
of means and the high cost of litigating claims of this type. 
Firstly, connections between members of transnational contractual networks are 
typically looser than those between constituent parts of organisational networks. 
Consequently, claims that are based on a direct duty of care owed to a third party victim by a 
                                                 
101 http://business-humanrights.org/en/koh-kong-sugar-plantation-lawsuits-re-cambodia#c86294; M. Mohan, 
‘The Road to Song Mao: Transnational Litigation from Southeast Asia to the United Kingdom’ [2014] AJIL 
Unbound e-30. 
102 http://business-humanrights.org/en/shell-lawsuit-re-oil-spills-bodo-community-in-nigeria. 
103 http://business-humanrights.org/en/vedanta-resources-re-water-contamination-zambia. 
104 The unusual case of Trafigura is an exception. It did not concern an organisational network or a contractual 
network. Another exception is the Song Mao litigation where the claimants commenced proceedings against the 
purchaser of sugar grown on the land arguing that they remained the legal owners of the land and thus the 
rightful owners of crops grown on it. 
105 For the importance of access to justice see the United National Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, available at http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles, in particular principle 25. 
Compare the German Lidl lawsuit (http://business-humanrights.org/en/lidl-lawsuit-re-working-conditions-in-
bangladesh) and the French Auchan lawsuit (http://business-humanrights.org/en/auchan-lawsuit-re-garment-
factories-in-bangladesh) where the German and French supermarkets were sued for allegedly misleading 
advertisements regarding the conditions in which the clothing that they were selling was produced by their 
suppliers from Bangladesh; see also the German KiK lawsuit commenced in 2015, in which the survivors and 
families of victims of a fire in a textile factory in Pakistan that resulted in 260 deaths seek compensation from 
KiK, the factory’s main customer (http://business-humanrights.org/en/kik-lawsuit-re-pakistan). 
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network member who was not directly exposed to third parties enjoy comparatively little 
chance of succeeding. In the English law of torts, for example, claims based on a direct duty 
of care by a parent company to a victim of the activities of a subsidiary can succeed only in 
truly exceptional circumstances.106 Using this line of case law as a benchmark, it can be 
concluded that the chances of an equivalent claim succeeding against the member of a 
contractual network not directly exposed to third parties are significantly lower because of the 
difficulty of demonstrating a sufficient degree of proximity between the alleged tortfeasor and 
the victim and foreseeability.107 As a result, victims of alleged gross violations of human 
rights and the environment committed overseas by a member of a transnational contractual 
network will find it very hard to find lawyers in the UK who will take on their case on a no-
win no-fee basis. 
The second reason why such victims will find it very hard to access justice in the UK 
concerns the interaction between the recent changes introduced in the system of legal fees by 
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the choice-of-law rules 
of Rome II.108 The changes introduced by the 2012 Act affected the recovery of fees and costs 
available to claimants, including human rights and environmental claimants. Before the entry 
into force of this Act on 1 April 2013, claimants were able to recover from defendants full 
legal costs, success fees and litigation insurance premiums. After this date, claimants cannot 
recover success fees109 and insurance premiums,110 but only ‘reasonable’ costs.111 Any 
success fee is now to be deducted from the damages awarded. Rome II, which applies to 
                                                 
106 Compare Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525, [2012] 1 WLR 3111 with Thompson v Renwick 
Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635, noted by U Grušić (2015) 74 CLJ 30. 
107 Compare C. van Dam, ‘Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms. On the Role of Tort Law in the Area 
of Business and Human Rights’ (2011) Journal of European Tort Law 221 and P Rott and V Ulfbeck, ‘Supply 
Chain Liability of Multinational Corporations?’ (2015) 23 European Review of Private Law 415, 430-6. 
108 See MD Goldhaber, ‘Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-US Courts: A Comparative Scorecard’ 
(2013) 3 UC Irvine Law Review 127, 133-4. 
109 S 44(4) of the 2012 Act. 
110 S 46(1). 
111 S 26(1) (‘Costs ordered against an individual in relevant civil proceedings must not exceed the amount (if 
any) which it is reasonable for the individual to pay having regard to all the circumstances’). 
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events giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 2009,112 has abolished the old 
common law choice-of-law rule according to which the amount of damages was always a 
matter for the law of the forum, i.e. English law.113 Under Rome II, the amount of damages is 
governed by the lex delicti, which is, as a matter of principle, the law of the country in which 
the damage occurs.114 Since the damage in cases brought by victims of alleged overseas gross 
violations of human rights and the environment typically occurs in a developing country, the 
amount of damages potentially recoverable in UK courts is now arguably lower than it was 
before 2009. This fact, coupled with the fact that claimants can only recover from defendants 
‘reasonable’ costs and that any success fee is now to be deducted from the damages awarded, 
reduces drastically the incentives for lawyers to take on a case under a no-win no-fee 
arrangement. This is confirmed by Richard Meeran, a leading UK litigator in this area, 
according to whom these changes are ‘a powerful deterrent against claimants’ lawyers 
undertaking these cases’.115 
These observations lead to the conclusion that the private international law framework 
which applies to claims by victims of alleged gross violations of human rights and the 
environment committed overseas by a member of a transnational contractual network is not 
well suited to deal with external risks generated by networks and is in an urgent need of 
change. One way of improving the law is through clarification, ideally at supra-national level, 
of conditions under which the whole network or at least the network members who 
participated in the generation and realisation of risk should be liable to third party victims. At 
the same time, courts could be allowed to apply these rules directly either because the 
                                                 
112 Case C-412/10 Homawoo v GMF Assurances ECLI:EU:C:2011:747, [2012] IL Pr 2. 
113 Wealands v Harding [2006] UKHL 32, [2007] 2 AC 1. 
114 Arts 4(1) and 15(c) Rome II. Arts 4(2) (the rule of the common habitual residence of the tortfeasor and the 
victim) and 4(3) (escape clause) are unlikely to apply. 
115 R Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation against Multinationals (“MNCs”) for Violation of Human Rights: an Overview of 
the Position outside the US’, available at http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/richard-meeran-tort-litigation-against-mncs-7-mar-
2011.pdf, 15. 
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transnational network has subscribed to them116 or as the applicable non-state rules of law. In 
addition, the victim could be given the possibility to choose the applicable law between the 
law of the place where the harmful event occurs and the law of the place of generation of 
significant risks.117 Finally, one should not forget the importance of adequate rules on 
litigation funding, either through legal aid or conditional or contingent fees, without which 
many litigations concerning transnational contractual networks are effectively impossible. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article demonstrates that contractual networks are an economic and sociological 
phenomenon that raises particular and important regulatory challenges. Given the ubiquity 
and economic importance of contractual networks, and the fact that their regulation occurs at 
national level, private international law, in particular European private international law, 
should take a conscious, active and positive role in their regulation with the aim of protecting 
and enhancing their efficiency and countering the risks that they create. 
The goal of protecting and enhancing the efficiency of transnational contractual 
networks requires private international law to foster cooperation and coordination in the 
network. Private international law can achieve this by leading to the unity of applicable law 
                                                 
116 This is not a fanciful proposition. Many transnational corporations voluntarily subscribe to various non-state 
bodies of law that concern corporate social responsibility. See, for example, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, Global Compact (http://www.unglobalcompact.org/), Agenda 21 
(http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=52&ArticleID=49), the International 
Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
(http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm), the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/) and 
the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility 
(http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm). 
117 Some inspiration can be drawn from Art 7 of Rome II, which lays down choice-of-law rules for 
environmental damage. For a critical view of Art 7 see U. Grušić, ‘International Environmental Litigation in EU 
Courts: A Regulatory Perspective’, forthcoming in (2016) 35 Yearbook of European Law. 
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governing either all bilateral relations in a network – be they contractual or non-contractual in 
nature – or network-related issues. The rules of European private international law are ill 
suited for this task for several reasons. Firstly, the fact that every bilateral relation in a 
network must be governed by a national law potentially creates the risk of conflict and 
contradiction whenever a non-state body of law is chosen to govern network relations. 
Secondly, it is unclear whether the parties can split their relationship by separating network-
related issues from other issues and subjecting them to one national law; the possibility of 
dépeçage is definitely excluded where the applicable law falls to be chosen by the default 
choice-of-law rules. Thirdly, the choice-of-law rules of Rome I and Rome II are focused on 
discrete, bilateral relations in a network and do not sufficiently take into account the 
organisational, company-like features of contractual networks. Fourthly, implied choice of 
law and the escape clauses of the two instruments are blunt tools that cannot routinely lead to 
network-friendly outcomes because they operate in exceptional circumstances only and do not 
allow an issue-by-issue choice-of-law analysis and the taking into account of the content of 
potentially applicable laws. Finally, mandatory rules often affect the choice-of-law process. 
Although they sometimes contribute positively to the regulation of transnational contractual 
networks, mandatory rules usually increase the risk of conflict and contradiction by creating 
or exacerbating the problem of application of multiple laws to transnational contractual 
networks. 
The goal of countering the external risks that transnational contractual networks create 
requires private international law, at the very least, not to hinder third parties who suffer harm 
as a result of the activities of a network from pursuing effective proceedings against both the 
network member to which they were directly exposed and the network members who 
participated in the generation and realisation of risk. Private international law rules in the UK 
fail in this respect. The interaction between the recent changes introduced in the system of 
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legal fees by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the 
choice-of-law rules of Rome II means that claimants can only recover from defendants 
‘reasonable’ costs (as opposed to ‘necessary’ costs) and that any success fee is now to be 
deducted from the damages awarded (as opposed being recoverable from defendants), the 
amount of which is arguably decreased because of the fact that the Rome II subjects this issue 
to the lex delicti and not the lex fori (as used to be the case under the English common law 
choice-of-law rules for torts). Coupled with the fact that claims that are based on a direct duty 
of care owed to a third party victim by a network member who was not directly exposed to 
third parties have very little chance of succeeding, the interaction between the rules on 
litigation funding and Rome II eliminates the incentives for lawyers to take on cases on a no-
win no-fee basis. 
There are several ways in which European private international law could be made 
more suitable for dealing with transnational contractual networks. The two Rome Regulations 
should give more weight to the organisational aspects of networks and the objective of unity 
of applicable law, for example by making the default choice-of-law rules, implied choice and 
the escape clauses more sensitive to the context of networks and by allowing the application 
of non-state rules of law. A factor to be taken into account when deciding on the application 
of overriding mandatory rules should be the potential undermining of the objectives of 
network regulation. Finally, third parties who suffer harm as a result of the activities of a 
network should have the possibility to pursue effective proceedings against all network 
members who participated in the generation and realisation of risk. This can only be achieved 
if adequate substantive law rules, either of national or transnational nature, and procedural law 
rules are in place alongside adequate private international law rules. 
